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Applying Federal Securities Law to Chapter 11
Claim Conversions
Blake J. Brockway *
"Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate
investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name
they are called."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Many view bankruptcy as the death of an investment, but to a keen-
eyed vulture investor it is the birth of opportunity. A bankruptcy fil-
ing is also among creditors' worst fears. The value of their debt and
the timing and amount of repayment is uncertain. Some creditors, es-
pecially those unfamiliar with bankruptcy, are willing to sell their
claims against the bankrupt debtor for pennies on the dollar.2 Sophis-
ticated investors who recognize the value of the claims stand willing to
purchase.3 A transaction is normally encouraged when two parties
disparately value an object; this is the essence of a market economy.
But what happens when a buyer has access to material, non-public
information that the seller lacks? Or when the buyer sits on a protec-
tive committee and breaches a fiduciary obligation to the seller?
Selling claims in bankruptcy is not new; neither are the accompany-
ing problems.4 Following the crash of 1929, Wall Street extensively
traded distressed debt. 5 The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") described this trading in its depression era report on protec-
tive and reorganization committees. 6 In a prior iteration of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, Chapter X explicitly punished fiduciaries, such as
* Juris Doctor from DePaul University College of Law, anticipated 2009; Bachelor of Science
in Economics and Agricultural Business from Iowa State University, 2005. I would like to thank
my family for their unending love and support.
1. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
2. Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in
Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4 (1990).
3. See e.g. Bo J. Howell, Hedge Funds: A New Dimension in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceed-
ings, 7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 35, 36 (2008-2009).
4. Fortgang & Meyer, supra note 2, at 8.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. (citing Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Study and Investigation of
the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees
1936-1940.
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members of protective committees, for trading claims.7 But regula-
tion gave way to administrative convenience and the benefits of claims
trading, and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code does not punish
those who trade claims.8
Regulation tends to chase regulatory problems.9 However, the
problems that result from claims trading have been faced before and
can be solved. Market regulators must remember the problems of the
past and use them to shape the future.10 Acting now could prevent
the need for reactionary regulation and could aid creditors facing an
increasing number of bankruptcy cases. During the twelve month pe-
riod ending June 30, 2009, over 1.3 million bankruptcy cases were
filed." In addition, business-related bankruptcy filings rose 63% from
33,822 for the twelve month period ending June 30, 2008, to 55,021 for
the twelve month period ending June 30, 2009.12 As our country en-
dures one of the longest recessions since the Great Depression,' 3 now
is the ideal time to revisit the treatment of claims trading, and if
needed, implement anticipatory regulation.
When it comes to regulating claims, scholars differ on how bank-
ruptcy claims ought to be treated. Advocates of the current system
argue that creditors benefit from the ability to liquidate their claims
and that current Bankruptcy laws provide adequate remedies to pre-
vent abuse.14 Some opponents of the current regime suggest that
trading claims has an adverse effect on the reorganization process;
therefore, the creditors' ability to transfer claims should be limited. 15
7. Id. at 11.
8. Id.
9. Historically, our country has adopted regulation in response to regulatory failures. For
example, the Great Depression was followed by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Enron and World Corn scandals led us to implement Sarbanes
Oxley.
10. John Kenneth Galbraith said it best, "As protection against financial illusion or insanity,
memory is far better than law. When memory of the 1929 disaster failed, law and regulation no
longer sufficed. For protecting people from the cupidity of others and their own, history is
highly utilitarian. It sustains memory and memory serves the same purpose as the SEC and, on
the record, is far more effective." JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, ix
(Houghton Mifflin Company 1972).
11. Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Rise in June, August 13, 2009, available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/PressReleases/2009/BankruptcyFilingsJun2009.cfm.
12. Id.
13. David Leonhardt, The Longest Recession Since..., NEW YORK TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG,
available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/01the-longest-recession-since (Decem-
ber 1, 2008).
14. See e.g. Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the
Federal Securities Laws?, 10 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569, 572-73 (2002).
15. Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1684, 1749-50
(1992).
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Others have suggested that federal securities laws might be applied to
bankruptcy claims. 16
In an attempt to find a middle ground, this article argues that fed-
eral security laws ought to apply when a bankruptcy claim is pur-
chased and converted to an equity position in the reorganized entity.
Whether claims are securities when they are not converted into equity
depends on the nature of the claim. If the instrument on which the
claim is based is a security, then securities laws should apply. If the
claim arose from debt that was not a security and is not sold and con-
verted into an equity position, then the claim is not a security and
ought to be regulated under the current bankruptcy regime.
This article begins by reviewing the statutory definitions of the term
"security" and applicable Supreme Court cases to answer the ques-
tion: What is a security? The article then discusses how bankruptcy
claims arise and are transferred. Section four illustrates how claims
are converted into an equity position in the reorganized entity and
discusses an investment firm that acquired a bankrupt company by
purchasing its claims. The fifth section develops some of costs and
benefits associated with claims trading. Section six discusses some of
the solutions that have been proposed to deal with problematic claims
trading. Finally, the seventh section applies the definition of a secur-
ity to determine when bankruptcy claims are considered securities and
introduces a proposed regulatory scheme.
II. WHAT IS A SECURITY?
To determine whether federal securities laws should apply to bank-
ruptcy claims, the term "security" must first be understood. The defi-
nition of a security is murky, and it ought to be."7 The term must
16. Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in
Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 46 (1990).
17. Critics of this statement may argue that a bright line rule for determining whether an
instrument is a security would be easier to follow and would allow for more effective planning.
Unfortunately, a bright line rule is also easier to evade. As the Reves Court observed:
An approach founded on economic reality rather than on a set of per se rules is subject
to the criticism that whether a particular note is a "security" may not be entirely clear
at the time it is issued. Such an approach has the corresponding advantage, though, of
permitting the SEC and the courts sufficient flexibility to ensure that those who market
investments are not able to escape the coverage of the Securities Acts by creating new
instruments that would not be covered by a more determinate definition.
Id. at 63 footnote 2.
The Supreme Court also recognized this phenomenon while discussing another fact-based securi-
ties law inquiry: materiality standard. The Court observed, "A bright-line rule indeed is easier to
follow than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances.
But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts
and Congress' policy decisions." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). Determining
2009]
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account for the "virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity." 18 The
definition begins to haze at the statutes, because the term security is
defined differently by three relevant statutes. In interpreting the term
security, the Supreme Court has added to the uncertainty by develop-
ing tests that expand the definition to account for some non-tradi-
tional investment vehicles, and has limited it to exclude some
instruments specifically identified as securities in the definitions.
When these decisions are viewed as a whole, a spectrum arises that
sheds light on the Court's judgment.
A. Statutory Definition of Security
The term "security" is defined by three statutes: the Securities Act
of 1933,19 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,20 and the Bank-
ruptcy Code.21 Each of these definitions starts by defining specific in-
whether an instrument is a security, like the materiality standard, requires judgment in the light
of all of the circumstances. In both cases, the ease of applying a bright line rule is outweighed by
the need to protect our securities markets.
18. S.E.C. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
19. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1)
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C.A, § 77b (West 2000).
20. Securities and Exchange Act § 3(a)(10)
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, de-
benture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganiza-
tion certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust cer-
tificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or
in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of inter-
est or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any re-
newal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (West 2000).
21. 11 U.S.C. §101(49)
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struments as securities. For example, all three statutes define any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, or debenture as a security. Each
definition also includes more general language such as investment
contract and certificate of interest. The phrase "evidence of indebted-
ness" appears in the definition of a "security" in the Securities Act of
1933,22 but is omitted from the definition of a "security" in the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934,23 and expressly excluded from the def-
inition of a "security" in the Bankruptcy Code.24
The application of the Bankruptcy Code's definition of security is
limited to the Bankruptcy Code, and is not meant to supersede the
securities laws' definition. 25 This article discusses the application of
securities laws to converted bankruptcy claims. Bankruptcy Rule
3001(e) left an opening for non-bankruptcy law to be applied to claims
transfers.26 Therefore, the definition of security Bankruptcy Code has
little value for determining whether a converted bankruptcy claim is a
security, because applying federal securities laws to claim conversions
is the type of non-bankruptcy remedy anticipated by Rule 3001(e). 27
The term "security" (A) includes - (i) note; (ii) stock; (iii) treasury stock; (iv) bond; (v)
debenture; (vi) collateral trust certificate; (vii) pre-organization certificate or subscrip-
tion; (viii) transferable share; (ix) voting trust certificate; (xi) certificate of deposit for
security; (xii) investment contract or certificate of interest or participation in a profit-
sharing agreement or in an oil, gas, or mineral royalty or lease, if such contract or
interest is required to be the subject of a registration statement filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, or is
exempt under section 3(b) of such Act from the requirement to file such a statement;
(xiii) interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership; (xiv) other claim or interest
commonly known as "security"; and (xv) certificate of interest or participation in, tem-
porary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase or sell, a security; but
(B) does not include - (i) currency, check, draft, bill of exchange, or bank letter of
credit; (ii) leverage transaction, as defined in section 761 of this title; (iii) commodity
futures contract or forward contract; (iv) option, warrant, or right to subscribe to or
purchase or sell a commodity futures contract; (v) option to purchase or sell a commod-
ity; (vi) contract or certificate of a kind specified in subparagraph (A)(xii) of this para-
graph that is not required to be the subject of a registration statement filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and is not exempt under section 3(b) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 from the requirement to file such a statement; or (vii) debt or
evidence of indebtedness for goods sold and delivered or services rendered.
11 U.S.C.A §101(49) (West 2007).
22. 15 U.S.C.A, § 77b (West 2000) (Securities Act § 2(a)(1)).
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (West 2000) (Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10)).
24. 11 U.S.C. §101(49)("The term 'security' . . . does not include . . . debt or evidence of
indebtedness for goods sold and delivered or services rendered.")
25. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14 at 610.
26. See Section III infra.
27. Id.
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B. Supreme Court Case Law Defining a Security
When determining whether an instrument is a security, the Court
typically begins by determining the congressional intent behind fed-
eral securities laws. 28 Congress enacted federal securities laws "to
eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. '29
"In defining the scope of the market that it wished to regulate, Con-
gress painted with a broad brush. It recognized the virtually limitless
scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of 'countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits.' "30 Congress did not intend to pro-
vide a remedy for all fraud, but rather, it sought to regulate all forms
of investments.31 To effectuate the purpose of the federal securities
laws, Congress adopted a broad definition of the term security, which
included numerous general terms that were broad enough to cover
nearly any investment vehicle. 32
The Supreme Court has articulated several tests to determine
whether or not an instrument is a security. Outside the specific fact
patterns that they address, these tests should not be applied rigidly,
but should be viewed as collective lessons to develop the range of in-
struments that are securities. In order to be effective, some non-tradi-
tional investment schemes must fall within the definition of a security,
and the Howey test sets the lower bound of the security spectrum. 33
The upper bound is found in the most obvious security - a traditional
publicly traded investment vehicle such as a publicly traded stock.34
However, not all of the instruments specifically defined as a security
by the statutes are considered securities. 35 In order to fall within the
definition of a security, the specific instrument must possess the usual
characteristics of that instrument. 36 The economic reality, not the
names given to the instrument, guides this inquiry. 37 Finally, the fam-
ily resemblance test limits the application of securities laws to some
specific instruments. 38
28. See e.g. Reves, 494 U.S. at 61.
29. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
30. Reves, 494 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. 293 at 299 ).
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id.
33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293.
34. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 62 ("common stock is the quintessence of a security").
35. See e.g. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848.
36. Id. at 851.
37. Id.
38. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65-66.
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the term security to include
some non-traditional investments or mechanisms. 39 In Howey, a com-
pany that operated a citrus grove and hotel resort offered to sell plots
of land and a service contract as an investment alternative to patrons
of its resort.40 The Court held that the land sale and service contract
constituted an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
of 1933.41 In reaching this decision the Court found that an invest-
ment contract exists when a person invests money in a common enter-
prise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of others.4 2
The Court exercised sound judgment in finding that the securities laws
must apply to some non-traditional investments. To hold otherwise
would open the door to evasion of the federal securities laws.
The Howey test does not always apply.43 In Landreth, a buyer pur-
chased all of the outstanding stock in a lumber business, and later
brought a federal securities suit against the seller.44 The district court
found that the stock was not a security because managerial control
passed to the buyer; therefore, he did not expect profits solely from
the efforts of others.45 The Supreme Court reversed and found that
the Howey test did not apply stating, "[w]hen an instrument is both
called a stock and bears stock's usual characteristics, 46 'a purchaser
[may] assume that the federal securities laws apply.' ,,47 Under Lan-
dreth, an instrument that is a security when it is publicly traded, is also
a security when exchanged in a privately negotiated transaction. 48
However, an instrument that is called a stock is not always a secur-
ity.49 In Forman, tenants purchased an instrument labeled a stock,
which allowed them to rent an apartment in a newly developed, state-
subsidized housing cooperative. 50 When the rental rates exceeded the
39. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293.
40. Id. at 294-297.
41. Id. at 293 (Investment contract is included in the definition of a security in § 2(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933).
42. Id.
43. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
44. Id. at 683.
45. Id. at 685.
46. The characteristics of common stock are: "(i) the right to receive dividends contingent
upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothe-
cated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value." Id. citing United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851
(1975).
47. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686.
48. Id.
49. Forman, 421 U.S. 837.
50. Id. at 840.
2009]
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original estimates, the renters sued under federal securities law.51 The
Supreme Court held that labeling an instrument a stock is not suffi-
cient for federal securities laws to apply.52 The Court looked to the
economic reality of the transaction and found that the instrument did
not have the common characteristics of a stock.53 The tenants did not
purchase the stock as an investment, but rather, purchased it in order
to acquire an apartment in state-subsidized housing.54 Unlike the
stock in Landreth, the instruments in Forman were not negotiable,
could not be pledged or hypothecated, did not convey voting rights,
and could not appreciate in value.55
Landreth's holding cannot apply to all instruments, because a literal
application could extend securities laws too far.56 The Court faced
this problem in Reves v. Ernst & Young.57 In Reves, an agricultural
cooperative sold demand notes to its patrons in order to raise capi-
tal.58 The notes paid a slightly higher interest rate than rates offered
by local banks.59 An advertisement for the notes contained a state-
ment indicating that the cooperative had $11 million in assets to stand
behind the investments and that they were safe, secure, and availa-
ble.60 The cooperative filed for bankruptcy and the note holders filed
suit against Ernst & Young alleging that they violated the antifraud
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to
follow generally accepted accounting principles when conducting an
audit.61
The Court held that the demand notes issued by the cooperative
were securities. 62 To reach its holding, the Supreme Court developed
the family resemblance test.63 Under the family resemblance test, a
note is presumed to be a security unless the issuer can show that the
note bears a strong family resemblance to an item on a judicially
crafted list of exceptions 64 or convinces the court to add something to
51. Id. at 844.
52. Id. at 848.
53. Id.
54. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848.
55. Id.
56. For example, if all notes were considered securities, then home mortgages and credit cards
would be covered by the federal securities laws.
57. Reves, 494 U.S. 56.
58. Id. at 59.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Reves, 494 U.S.. at 60.
63. Id. at 67.
64. The list of judicially crafted exceptions includes:
i. a note delivered in consumer financing,
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that list.65 The Court applied the following factors to determine if a
note bears a strong family resemblance to a security: (i) the motiva-
tions that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into
the transaction; (ii) the instruments plan of distribution; (iii) the rea-
sonable expectations of the investing public, and (iv) some other fac-
tor such as the existence of an alternate regulatory scheme that
reduces the risk of the instrument making the use of federal securities
laws unnecessary. 66
In applying the family resemblance test to the demand notes pur-
chased by the cooperative patrons, the Court started with the pre-
sumption that the notes were securities. 67 The parties agreed that the
demand notes did not resemble any of the judicially crafted excep-
tions so the Court proceeded with the four-factor test.68 In terms of
the motivation of the buyers and sellers, the Court found that the
notes raised capital and were purchased to earn a profit - traditional
aspects of securities. 69 The notes were broadly distributed to mem-
bers of the public. 70 The demand notes were also perceived by buyers
and advertised by the sellers as an investment. 71 Finally, the court did
not find any risk-reducing factors such as alternate federal regulation,
collateral, or insurance. 72
At first glance, these cases provide a rigid framework, but they are
best understood as revealing a spectrum of instruments that resemble
the form of a security. The strongest form of a security is publicly
traded stock.73 Publicly traded stocks are widely distributed, heavily
traded, raise capital, are negotiable, and investors trade them expect-
ing a profit. The closer an instrument is to resembling that form, the
more likely that it is a security. Judgment guides the inquiry and case
law provides the framework and boundaries. With these principles
ii. a note secured by a mortgage on a home,
iii. a short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets,
a note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an
iv. assignment of accounts receivable, or
a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of
v. business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a broker, it is collateralized).
Id. at 65 (citing Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d
Cir. 1976)).
65. Id. at 67.
66. Id. at 66-67.
67. Id. at 67.
68. Reves, 494 U.S,.at 67-68.
69. Id. at 68.
70. Id. at 68.
71. Id. at 69.
72. Id.
73. Reves, 494 U.S,.at 62.
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established, the article will now proceed to discuss how bankruptcy
claims arise, and are transferred and converted into equity in a reorga-
nized entity. This transaction, on the whole, so closely resembles the
form of a security that securities laws ought to apply.74
III. THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS
When a company files for bankruptcy its creditors are issued an au-
tomatic stay.75 The automatic stay prevents creditors from collecting
debts and grants them a claim against the bankrupt entity.76 A claim
is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a "right to payment, whether or
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured,
or unsecured . .. ,77 Claims against the debtor arise from secured
debt, unsecured debt, bonds, trade claims, contract claims, wage, sal-
ary and benefits claims, and other claims incurred in the ordinary
course of business. Generally, a creditor who wishes to recover for a
debt owed by a Chapter 11 entity must file a notice of claim.78 Once
established, a claim against a bankrupt entity is freely tradable. 79
Many creditors sell their claims, sometimes at a steep discount.80 In
fact, the market for bankruptcy claims has been estimated as high as
$300 billion dollars.81 Buyers of these claims include hedge funds, pri-
vate equity firms, banks, and other sophisticated financial entities. 82
Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) governs the mechanics of claims trans-
fers. 83 This rule was amended in 1991 to streamline the claims trading
process and limit the Bankruptcy Court's involvement in claims trad-
ing.84 Under the current rule, publicly traded notes, bonds and deben-
tures are not subject to the transfer restrictions articulated in Rule
3001(e). 85 However, the explanatory comments expressly provide:
74. See Section VII infra.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2008).
76. Id.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2008). See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (The term claim also means
a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to a equitable remedy is reduced by judgment, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured").
78. 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2008).
79. In re Pleasant Hill Partners, L.P., 163 BR 388, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
80. Fortgang & Meyer, supra note 2, at 4.
81. Tung, supra note 12, at 1685.
82. Michael Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist
Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703,714 (2008).
83. Bankr. R. 3001(e).
84. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 569.
85. Bankr. R. 3001(e)(2-4) ("If a claim other than one based on a publicly traded note, bond,
or debenture has been transferred...").
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Subdivision (e) is amended to limit the court's role to the adjudica-
tion of disputes regarding transfers of claims .... If a timely objec-
tion is filed, the court's role is to determine whether a transfer has
been made that is enforceable under nonbankruptcy law. This rule
is not intended either to encourage or discourage postpetition trans-
fers of claims or to affect any remedies otherwise available under
nonbankruptcy law to a transferor or transferee such as for misrep-
resentation in connection with the transfer of a claim.86
As the above comment indicates, Rule 3001(e) was amended to
eliminate the need for up front approval of claims transfers while al-
lowing the court to review a claim transfer when a party later objects.
The plain language of this comment would allow a bankruptcy court
to apply federal securities laws to claims transfers. This language
could prove especially useful when claims are purchased and con-
verted into an equity position in the reorganized entity.8 7
IV. JAPONICA PARTNER'S ACQUISITION OF ALLEGHENY
INTERNATIONAL: THE PARADIGM CASE OF A
CLAIMS CONVERSION
As a part of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, a company can pro-
vide payment for claims by issuing equity in the reorganized entity to
claim holders. Bankruptcy courts have permitted this type payment
under Bankruptcy Code § 510(c). 88 Some investors have utilized this
feature to acquire a controlling interest in the reorganized entity.89
Perhaps the most renowned example was Japonica Partners' acquisi-
tion of Allegheny International.90 Although the acquisition occurred
nearly two decades ago, it remains one of the best examples of a
claims trading takeover.91 The increased number of business-related
bankruptcy filings and illiquid credit markets may set the stage for
another similar takeover.
Japonica's quest for Allegheny began in the early stages of the
bankruptcy proceeding. Japonica was interested in the strength of Al-
86. Advisory Comments to 1991 Amendments of Bankr. R. 3001.
87. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 593.
88. Section 510(c) ("the court may under the principles of equitable subordination,
subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another
allowed claim or all of an allowed interest.").
89. See infra text accompanying notes 28-55.
90. See HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 165 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2000).
91. The Allegheny International decision continues to add value, because it has been highly
scrutinized by legal and economic scholars. Further, few companies have been taken over while
in bankruptcy. As one observer noted, "most bankrupt companies were bankrupt for a reason:
They were lousy companies." Id. at 173.
2009]
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legheny's brands,92 and believed the company had manipulated its
financials to make it appear worse than its actual condition.93 When
Japonica's principals offered to purchase the bankrupt entity for $700
million, the company's board members and creditors were unim-
pressed by the brazenness of Japonica's principals and were not con-
vinced that the hedge fund could find financing.94 However, the
United States Trustee and one company official convinced the credi-
tors and board of directors to furnish Japonica with information to
solidify its bid. 95 But relations rapidly deteriorated as the company
became increasingly suspicious of Japonica's financing,96 and the
hedge fund accused the company of failing to provide it with adequate
information. 97 Undeterred, Japonica's takeover strategy turned
hostile. 98
The company filed its Chapter 11 reorganization plan on December
29, 1989, and the bankruptcy court approved its disclosure statement
on February 5, 1990.99 Japonica filed a competing reorganization plan
on January 24, 1990.100 The company's plan offered creditors stock
valued at $7.00 per share, while the Japonica plan offered the cash
equivalent of $6.42 per share.' 0 ' From March 15, 1990 until June 11,
1990, Japonica performed due diligence in Allegheny's office using
Allegheny's facilities.' 02 After filing its plan, Japonica purchased
claims in three ways. 10 3 From February 23, 1990 through March 30,
1990, Japonica negotiated directly with banks and other unsecured
debt holders to purchase nearly $65 million in claims at 80-95% of
their face value. 10 4 Japonica also purchased around $20 million of
claims from a creditor in a separate class for about 66% of their face
value.' 05 Finally, Japonica commenced a tender offer on April 14,
1990, which was to remain open until May 16, 1990, to purchase the
92. Allegheny manufactured household products under two very well known brand names:
Sunbeam and Oster. Id. at 174.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 177.
95. Id. at 177-78.
96. ROSENBERo, supra note 90, at 184.
97. Id. at 197.
98. See id. at 187-96.
99. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 286 (Bankr. W.D. Penn.1990).
100. Id. To become a party of interest, Japonica purchased $10,000 of subordinate debentures
for $2712. Id. Under Bankruptcy Code § 1121 the debtor or any party of interest may file a
plan. Bankruptcy Code § 1121.
101. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 286.
102. Id. at 295.
103. Id. at 286-87, 294-95. See also Fortgang & Thomas Mayer, supra note 2, at 83-84.
104. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 286-87.
105. Id.
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subordinate debt of one of Allegheny's subsidiaries.10 6 By purchasing
at least one-third of the claims in two impaired classes, Japonica was
able to secure a blocking position, which would make it difficult for
the company to confirm its plan.107 However, the court used its equi-
table powers to designate Japonica's votes, and found that allowing a
plan proponent to purchase claims to block an alternate plan rendered
other creditors' votes meaningless. 108
By designating Japonica's votes, Judge Cosetti confirmed the com-
pany's plan over Japonica's objections. 0 9 He found that Japonica ac-
ted in bad faith by commencing a tender offer before its disclosure
statement was approved, purchasing claims to obtain a blocking posi-
tion, and misusing inside information.110 The company's plan created
another problem, a "Control Transaction" provision allowed any
holder to exercise a put option to sell its shares to a controlling per-
son, which was defined as any person holding in excess of 45% of the
reorganized entity's common stock."1 At this juncture, Japonica fell
within that definition. 112 To solve the problem, the court held Japon-
ica's shares in trust without voting rights unless Japonica demon-
strated that it was able to respond to puts from all shareholders at a
price of $7.00 per share. 113 If Japonica failed, its shares were to be
held in trust for three years. 114
After the decision, Japonica negotiated to purchase the banks
claims for $1.05 on the dollar, which translated to approximately $6.60
per share, and agreed to pay all other classes $7.00 per share.11 5 The
court approved the settlement and the parties closed on September
28, 1990.116 In total, Japonica paid $660 million for the company and
around $15 million in fees. 117 The hedge fund's principals took man-
agement roles in the company and implemented aggressive cost-cut-
106. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 294-95.
107. Id. at 290.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 285.
110. Id. at 294-99.
111. Id. at 300.
112. Id. at 300-01. Here, the court treats the claims as if they were stock, because the control
provision defines a controlling person as a person who "acquires beneficial ownership in excess
of 45% of the Common Stock of the Corporation." Id. at 300. The court noted, "Japonica has
voluntarily purchased claims in various classes which are to receive stock and warrants." Id. at
301. Therefore, the court is treating the claims as if they were stock.
113. Id. at 303
114. Id.
115. Rosenberg, supra note 90, at 221.
116. Id. at 223-24.
117. Id. at 225.
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ting measures.118 Japonica cut the company's headquarters staff from
sixty to fifteen and introduced ten new products by the spring of
1991.119 The reorganized company, Sunbeam-Oster went public in
August 1992 raising $250 million and still leaving 77% in the hands of
Japonica's investors. 120 Japonica's purchase of the troubled company
and ability to turn it around was, in many ways, a success. However,
part of that success may have come at the cost of some of Allegheny's
creditors.
V. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CLAIMS TRADING
Japonica's acquisition of Allegheny International is illustrative of
the costs and benefits of claims trading. The benefits of claims trad-
ing, such as increased liquidity and economies of scale, are a major
driving force for those who support less restricted claims trading.
However, the costs of deregulation can be significant. Claims trading
can result in purchasers utilizing inside information or breaching of
fiduciary duties owed to the sellers. And Bankruptcy courts, despite
their equitable powers, may not have the resources or expertise to
adequately address these problems.
Allowing investors to purchase bankruptcy claims provides many
benefits to creditors. Claims trading increases market liquidity, 121 and
enables creditors to sell their claims at a discount rather than endure a
bankruptcy proceeding. 22 Creditors can also obtain tax advantages
and manage regulatory risks by selling their claims.123 By purchasing
claims, an investor can achieve economies of scale and reduce the ad-
ministrative costs associated with a bankruptcy proceeding. 24 In ad-
dition, reducing the number of interested parties can lead to a more
rapid, better structured reorganization. 125
But the advantages of claims trading do not come without cost.
Often claims are traded by members of protective committees or
other parties that owe a fiduciary duty to the sellers.126 In addition,
these parties may obtain material, non-public information about the
118. Id. at 225-27.
119. Id. at 225-26.
120. Id. at 228.
121. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 575.
122. Fortgang & Meyer, supra note 2, at 4.
123. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 575.
124. Fortgang & Meyer, supra note 2, at 6-7 (noting that an investor who acquires a large
number of claims has more of an incentive to invest time and money in the bankruptcy process
than a smaller claimant).
125. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 576.
126. See e.g. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 297.
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bankrupt entity that has a profound effect on the value of the
claims. 127 Claims trading also has a harmful effect on the reorganiza-
tion process when claims are purchased in an attempt to manipulate a
reorganization effort. 128
Japonica's acquisition of Allegheny International raised many of
the problems that arise from claims trading. Japonica was permitted
to conduct in depth due diligence because of its status as a plan propo-
nent. 129 Pursuant to an order of the court, Japonica entered Alle-
gheny's corporate headquarters from March 16, 1990 until June 11,
1990 to conduct the due diligence. 130 Implanted in the headquarters,
Japonica had direct contact with company employees and was permit-
ted to interview management.13' In addition, the hedge fund received
a large volume of information that was not available to creditors,
shareholders, or the general public.132 As the court observed, "Japon-
ica had vast knowledge of the most intimate details of this company
unmatched by any other creditor."'1 33
Japonica's ability to acquire inside financial information was partic-
ularly important, because the hedge fund believed that Allegheny's
management had manipulated the company's financial information. 34
Japonica suspected that Alegheny's pre-bankruptcy management
team overstated the severity of the company's condition in order to
make themselves look better after the company re-emerged from
bankruptcy. 35 One example of a potential misrepresentation was an
off-balance sheet asset that Japonica discovered after acquiring the
company. 136 Based upon its extended access to material, non-public
information and its status as a plan proponent, the court found that
Japonica was an insider and a fiduciary.1 37 And temporary insiders
owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders. 138
After receiving the keys to the castle, access to employees, and
volumes of material, non-public information, Japonica continued to
purchase claims. 139 Japonica's status as an insider meant that it owed
127. Id.
128. Tung, supra note 15, at 1686.
129. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 298.
130. Id.
131. Id. See also Rosenberg, supra note 90, at 209.
132. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 298.
133. Id. at 296.
134. Rosenberg, supra note 90, at 174.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 226-27.
137. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 299.
138. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655, n. 14 (1983).
139. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 286-87.
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fiduciary duties to other creditors while it was purchasing claims. 140
Between March 23, 1990 and March 30, 1990, Japonica purchased
claims with a face value of nearly $25 million for 82-95% of their face
value. 41 Japonica also arranged to purchase senior unsecured claims
from Swiss Volksbank for 66% of their face value sometime between
March 19, 1990 and March 30, 1990.142 On June 8, 1990, Japonica at-
tempted to modify its plan to pay approximately 95% of the face
value for the claims that it had just acquired from Swiss Volksbank - a
move that the court called "chutzpah with a vengeance."'1 43
The court also found that Japonica manipulated the bankruptcy
process in an attempt to gain control of the company. 144 Before Ja-
ponica's disclosure statement was approved it launched a tender offer
for subordinate debt and general unsecured claims of Allegheny's sub-
sidiary.145 The tender offer was not approved by the court and dis-
criminated between members of the same creditor class in violation of
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4). 146 Japonica's strategic purchase of claims to
advance its position as plan proponent constituted bad faith and hin-
dered the reorganization process.147 Japonica's acquisition of Alle-
gheny International created benefits for creditors who were looking to
exit, but it raised numerous regulatory concerns.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR CLAIMS TRADING
Bankruptcy courts and commentators have struggled to find an ap-
propriate method for regulating the harmful effects of claims trading.
Given the positive effects, a complete prohibition on claims trading is
not an appropriate solution.148 Still some regulation is needed to limit
the effects of insider trading, breaches of fiduciary duties, and manip-
ulation of the reorganization process. Bankruptcy courts have at-
tempted to regulate claims trading by using their broad equitable
powers to limit claims purchasers' recovery to the amount they paid
for their claims.149 Some commentators have called for the use of "big
boy letters" and "Chinese Walls" to improve disclosure, limit reliance
140. Id. at 299.
141. Id. at 287.
142. Id. at 287, 292-93.
143. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 297.
144. Id. at 299.
145. Id. at 294-95.
146. Id. at 295.
147. Id. at 296.
148. Tung, supra note 15, at 1749.
149. Citicorp Venture Capital Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160
F.3d 982, 991 (3d Cir. 1998).
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based claims, and eliminate fiduciary liability. However, these mecha-
nisms have failed to protect individual creditors.
One of the proposed remedies for dealing with problematic claims
trading is to allow bankruptcy courts to exercise their equitable pow-
ers to regulate claim purchasers. 150 Commentators suggest that the
bankruptcy code provides adequate protections even when claim pur-
chasers are seeking to gain control of the reorganized company.151
Bankruptcy courts have relied upon Bankruptcy Code Sections
1123(a)(4), 152 1125(b),153 and 1126(e) 154 and their equitable powers to
regulate claims trading. 155 For example, as observed in Japonica's ac-
quisition of Allegheny, bankruptcy courts can utilize their equitable
powers to designate votes of claim purchasers who acted in bad
faith.156 Commentators who favor this approach believe that bank-
ruptcy courts should be granted the flexibility to allow claims trading
and determine whether an entity that is acquiring claims is actually
harming creditors.1 57 They have also suggested that bankruptcy courts
can protect creditors from the same abuses that securities laws protect
against. 58
One way that bankruptcy courts have sought to protect the market
against claims trading by insiders is to utilize their equitable powers to
limit claims purchasers' recovery to the amount they paid for their
claims.159 In Citicorp, an investment firm, which was deemed an in-
sider, acquired claims "at a significant discount" without disclosing its
150. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 620.
151. Id. at 621.
152. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2005) ("Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonban-
kruptcy law, a plan shall.., provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular
class, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of
such particular claim or interest ..
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2205)
An acceptance or rejection of a plan may not be solicited after the commencement of
the case under this title from a holder of a claim or interest with respect to such claim
or interest, unless, at the time of or before such solicitation, there is transmitted to such
holder the plan or a summary of the plan, and a written disclosure statement approved,
after notice and a hearing, by the court as containing adequate information. The court
may approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of the debtor or an appraisal of
the debtor's assets.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e)(2005) ("On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not
in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions
of this title.")
155. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 592-93.
156. See supra part IV.
157. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 621.
158. Id.
159. Citicorp, 160 F.3d at 991. See also Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 589-90.
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fiduciary status or obtaining approval from the board of directors,
creditors' committee, or bankruptcy court.160 The investment firm
then opposed the reorganization plan and sought to introduce its own
plan until it saw the bankruptcy court's adverse reaction. 161 The dis-
trict court and Third Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's decision to
use its equitable powers to limit the investment funds recovery to the
aggregate purchase price of the claims. 162
Although the Citicorp court made a valiant effort, its actions did not
protect individual claim holders, but rather, protected the market by
imposing a penalty designed to discourage future abusive practices. 63
The Citicorp decision may leave unsophisticated individual claim sell-
ers unprotected. Citicorp is also illustrative of another claims trading
problem: insiders may purchase claims without disclosing their sta-
tus. 164 Some have suggested that this problem could be remedied by
amending Rule 3001(e) to require purchasers to disclose their insider
status.165 Again, at least one commentator has suggested that these
problems could be solved by the combined use of big boy letters and
Chinese Walls. 166
Big boy letters state that either or both parties to the claim transfer
may have access to inside information and are used as a defense to
insider trading liability. 167 Big boy letters attempt avoid claims based
on Rule 10b-5 by contractually eliminating reliance, a requirement of
private Rule 10b-5 actions. 168 Although some courts have upheld
such contracts, 169 the anti-waiver provision of Rule 10b-5 seems to
preclude non-reliance letters. 70 Even when they are allowed, big boy
letters are only effective when they provide full disclosure and when
both parties to the transaction are sophisticated. Proponents of big
160. Citicorp, 160 F.3d at 985.
161. Id. at 986.
162. Id. at 991.
163. See Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 589.
164. Citicorp, 160 F.3d at 985.
165. See e.g. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14.
166. Daniel Sullivan, Comment, Big Boys and Chinese Walls, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 565
(2008).
167. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, 533.
168. Sullivan, supra note 166 at 560.
169. See e.g. id. (citing Harsco v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1996)).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) ("Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or
of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."). But see AES Corp. v. Dow Chemi-
cal Co., 325 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a non-reliance clause dos not bar a Rule
10b-5 claims, but may be considered as evidence on the issue of reliance).
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boy letters recognize that they are not sufficient to solve problematic
claims trading, because they do not address fiduciary liability.171
To eliminate fiduciary liability, some suggest implementing Chinese
Walls to separate an entity's fiduciary activities from its claims
purchasing activities. Bankruptcy courts have permitted the use of
Chinese Walls to establish a defense for claims trading. 172 In theory,
Chinese Walls have some value when they separate an entity's
purchasing activity from its role on a creditors committee. However,
as observed in Japonica's acquisition of Allegheny, sometimes an in-
vestment firm's status as a fiduciary is derived from its status as a plan
proponent; a role that is inextricably linked to the value of bankruptcy
claims.17 3 In addition, Allegheny illustrates a practical problem -
hedge funds are often small, closely held entities and there is no guar-
antee that a Chinese Wall would remain effective.
Big boy letters can improve disclosures between claims purchasers
and sellers, and Chinese Walls can separate fiduciary activities from
purchasing activities.174 But these mechanisms are designed to limit
liability for claims purchasers.175 While they may aid purchasers in
limiting their liability, they do not adequately protect sellers from
fraud. Even if they are combined, big boy letters and Chinese Walls
should not replace a bankruptcy court's ability to engage in equitable
subordination or offer rescission through the imposition of federal se-
curities laws.
VII. APPLYING SECURITIES LAWS TO BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS
This section begins by reviewing when claims should be considered
securities. Bankruptcy claims do not instantly become securities once
a bankruptcy proceeding is filed. However, sometimes claims clearly
fall within the definition of a security. The second subsection devel-
ops the proposed regulatory regime for bankruptcy claims. This arti-
cle envisions shared responsibility for claims regulation between the
bankruptcy court and Securities and Exchange Commission. The
bankruptcy courts would have the primary responsibility for regulat-
ing claims transactions, but could call upon the expertise of the Com-
mission if securities laws were invoked.
171. Sullivan, supra note 166, at 559.
172. See id. at 556 citing In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. 1991 WL 79143, *2 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio).
173. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 299.
174. Sullivan, supra note 166, at 533.
175. Id.
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A. Converted Claims Are Securities
Securities laws ought to apply when claims are purchased and con-
verted into an equity position in the reorganized entity. The economic
reality of this transaction on the whole cannot be distinguished from
one that involves a security. If bankruptcy claims are not converted,
they ought to be classified based on their underlying instruments.
Bankruptcy claims that arise from securities must be treated as securi-
ties at all times. Some claims are based on instruments that are not
securities, such as claims based on judgments, trade debt, contracts,
and wages. Federal securities laws should not apply to these claims
unless they are purchased and converted into an equity position in the
reorganized entity.
When a buyer purchases a bankruptcy claim with the intent to con-
vert it, and succeeds in converting it into an equity position in the
reorganized entity, the buyer has purchased a security. Landreth and
Forman stand for the proposition that the name given to the instru-
ment is not as important as the economic reality of the transaction.176
Stated differently, the substance of the transaction is more important
than its form. 177 In purchasing and converting a claim, the buyer in-
vests to earn a profit and receives a tradable, negotiable instrument
that performs a capital raising function 178 for the seller.179 The eco-
nomic reality of this transaction, on the whole, so closely resembles
the form of a security that it must be treated as one. This is especially
true when claims are purchased after a reorganization plan that con-
verts those claims into equity in the reorganized entity being filed.1 80
Even opponents of applying securities laws to bankruptcy claims have
acknowledged that this type of transaction presents a strong case for
imposing federal securities laws. 181
Japonica's acquisition of Allegheny International represents the
paradigm case of an investor purchasing and converting claims to
which federal securities laws ought to apply. 182 Japonica purchased
claims with the intent of controlling the debtor and converting the
176. Compare Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686 with Forman, 421 U.S. at 2059. See also supra Part
II.B.
177. Forman, 421 U.S. at 2059.
178. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 8 ("By paying cash for claims and, in effect, con-
verting claims to securities, postpetition investors perform a capital raising function.").
179. See supra Part VI.B.
180. This transaction closely resembles a call option, because the purchaser can hold the claim
until a certain date and obtain equity or resell it in a secondary market.
181. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 620-21.
182. See supra Parts III and IV.
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claims into an equity position in the reorganized entity.183 The court
inferred this intent from Japonica's long standing interest in acquiring
the debtor and the manner in which the claims were purchased. 184
The court noted that Japonica began purchasing claims at 80% of their
face value, increased this percentage to 85 %, and eventually paid 95 %
of face value in order to obtain a blocking position.1 85 Once the
blocking position was obtained, Japonica purchased claims at 82% of
the face value. 186 This pattern revealed Japonica's true motive: to se-
cure a blocking position that would aid its acquisition efforts. In addi-
tion, Japonica did not begin purchasing claims until after a
reorganization plan, which converted the claims into an equity posi-
tion in the reorganized entity, was filed. After purchasing the claims,
Japonica was able to convert them into equity ownership of the reor-
ganized entity. The economic reality of Japonica's purchase closely
resembles a stock purchase.
Whether securities laws should apply when a claim is not converted
to an equity position depends on the nature of the underlying instru-
ment. Securities laws ought to apply to claims based on instruments
that were securities before the petition date. Examples of these types
of instruments include the company's prepetition stock, bonds, and
debentures. 18 7 As observed in Landreth, when an instrument purports
to be an item that is specifically defined as a security and possesses the
characteristics of that instrument, it is a security. 188 Put differently,
claims based on stocks, bonds, and debentures bear a strong resem-
blance to the form of a security. If securities laws did not apply to
these instruments, then filing bankruptcy would come with the unfor-
tunate consequence of eliminating the protections of federal securities
laws.
Not all of the instruments that give rise to bankruptcy claims are
based on securities. These types of claims should not be treated as
securities unless they are purchased and converted into equity in the
reorganized entity. Claims based on trade debt (or trade claims) are
one example of this category of claims. To determine whether uncon-
verted trade claims are securities we must apply the Reves test to the
underlying instrument.1 89 The Second Circuit decision that first ar-
ticulated the family resemblance test found that a note which simply
183. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 289-90.
184. Id. at 295.
185. Id. at 287.
186. Id.
187. Securities and Exchange Act § 3(a)(10).
188. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686.
189. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65-66.
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formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of
business, such as a trade claim, was presumptively not a security. 190
However, the four-factor Reves test must also be applied to the un-
derlying trade claims. In terms of motivations, trade claims arise to
facilitate purchases and sales in the ordinary course of business. They
are not designed to fulfill investment goals or to perform traditional
capital raising functions. Trade claims are not typically distributed to
the public and are not commonly traded. In addition, trade debts are
not viewed or portrayed as investments. Finally, trade debts may be
secured by collateral. Given that at least three of the four Reves fac-
tors favor the finding that trade debts are not securities and that they
were on the judicially crafted list of exceptions, claims based on these
instruments should not be treated as securities unless they are pur-
chased and converted into equity in the reorganized entity.
In conclusion, bankruptcy claims based on securities, and claims
that are purchased and converted into equity in the reorganized en-
tity, fall within the definition of a security. Other bankruptcy claims
such as claims based on trade debt, wages, and liens do not fall within
this definition.
B. Regulating Claims Transactions
The goal of any regulatory scheme applied to bankruptcy claims is
to allow creditors and debtors to obtain the benefits of claims trading
while preventing the abuses that can arise from these transactions.
The proposed regime permits claims transfers but regulates them in
two ways. First, bankruptcy courts would utilize their equitable pow-
ers to regulate claims transfers that did not qualify as securities. Sec-
ond, federal securities laws would be applied to claims that are based
on securities or to claims that are purchased and converted into equity
in the reorganized entity. Treating these claims as securities does not
invoke all federal securities laws, because certain exemptions would
continue to apply. Rather than conduct an expansive review of securi-
ties law implications, this article reviews how the disclosure require-
ments and insider trading laws could be applied. A key advantage of
the proposed resolution is that it allows bankruptcy courts to continue
to operate efficiently but permits securities law experts to enforce in-
sider trading laws.
Even though converted bankruptcy claims fall within the definition
of a "security," not all of the federal securities laws apply. Section
1145(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides an exemption that allows a
190. Exch.Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2nd Cir. 1976).
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reorganizing entity to issue securities without fulfilling the disclosure
and registration requirements of the Securities Act. 191 One of the jus-
tifications for this exemption is that the Bankruptcy Code already re-
quires debtors to make significant disclosures and obtain court
approval of its disclosure statement. This exemption also allows debt-
ors to avoid the costs and time consumed by preparing and filing a
registration statement. Section 1145(b) exempts certain creditors and
shareholders from being considered underwriters for purposes of the
Securities Act. 192 As legal scholars Fortgang and Mayer observed,
"The SEC has liberally interpreted these provisions in various no-ac-
tion letters."'1 93 The current bankruptcy disclosure regime and securi-
ties law exemption should continue to be applied even when claims
are converted into equity.
Recognizing that converted claims are securities allows the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, as well as private plaintiffs, to enforce
insider trading laws. Purchasing claims can involve many of the ele-
ments of traditional insider trading. The "deceptive device" provi-
sions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when corporate
insiders trade their company's securities on the basis of material, non-
public information. 194 Corporate insiders owe stock holders a duty to
disclose or refrain from trading in order to prevent them from taking
advantage of uniformed parties. 195 This duty arises from the relation-
ship of trust and confidence that exists between shareholders and cor-
porate insiders. 196 Classical insider trading theory also applies to
temporary corporate insiders who become fiduciaries. 97
Japonica's acquisition of Allegheny International presented many
of the elements of insider trading. The bankruptcy court found that
Japonica was an insider, because it had vast knowledge of the most
intimate details of the company. 98 Japonica was positioned inside Al-
legheny's corporate office and was given access to material, non-pub-
lic financial information. 199 As a temporary insider, Japonica was
placed in a position of trust and confidence and owed other creditors a
191. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a). For greater detail on the technical aspects of this provision see Fort-
gang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 57 and Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 624.
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(b).
193. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 2, at 57 (citing Wickes Companies/Homecrafters Ware-
house, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 10, 1986); Lezak Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(Oct. 3, 1985)).
194. U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
195. Id. at 652.
196. Id.
197. Id. citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655, n. 14 (1983).
198. Allegheny Int'l, 118 B.R. at 299.
199. Id. at 298.
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fiduciary duty. 200 Therefore, the firm needed to make adequate dis-
closures in order to avoid insider trading liability.201 If Japonica failed
to make adequate disclosures and federal securities laws were applied,
the firm could have faced civil and criminal penalties.
When claims are not considered securities, the bankruptcy courts
should continue to utilize their equitable powers to seek remedies for
abusive transactions. Bankruptcy courts have broad power to enforce
equitable remedies. 20 2 If abusive trading occurs, courts may use equi-
table subordination to limit purchasers' ability to recover and protect
the market as a whole. Courts should also consider offering former
claim holders the right to rescind their sales in order to protect indi-
vidual creditors. Offering securities law remedies, such as rescinding a
sale, has been classified by some commentators as applying securities
laws by analogy.203 Bankruptcy courts should utilize these remedies
in order to protect the market as well as individual claims sellers.
One advantage the proposed regime is that it permits a dual regula-
tory effort under which both bankruptcy courts and the Securities and
Exchange Commission could regulate claims trading. Bankruptcy
courts would have the primary responsibility for regulating claims
transfers, but they could contact the Commission if securities laws
were implicated. Several statutory provisions support this type of dual
regulatory regime. An explanatory comment to Bankruptcy Rule
3001(e) states that the claims transfer provisions are "not intended to
either encourage or discourage postpetition transfers of claims or to
affect any remedies otherwise available under nonbankruptcy
law... 2 0 4 This provision seems to support the application of federal
securities laws to claims transfers.20 5 In addition, section 1109(a)
states "The Securities and Exchange Commission may raise and may
appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter,...206
The proposed regime allows creditors and debtors to continue to
sell their claims rather than endure a bankruptcy proceeding. Pur-
chasers are free to accumulate claims; however, if the claims are con-
verted into an equity position, federal securities laws will apply.
Applying federal securities laws should not change bankruptcy's dis-
closure requirements, but would allow the SEC and claims sellers to
200. Id. at 298-99.
201. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 105 ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the title.").
203. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 14 at 574-75.
204. Advisory Comments to 1991 Amendments of Bankr. R. 3001.
205. But see Drain & Scwhartz, supra note 14 at 579-80.
206. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
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pursue securities fraud and insider trading actions. This remedy will
encourage purchasers who have inside information, and are plan pro-
ponents or creditors committee members, to make complete disclo-
sures prior to purchasing claims. If purchasers fail to abide by the
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act, claims sell-
ers will be able to seek civil damages such as rescission of the sale or
disgorgement of profits. Criminal sanctions could also be imposed on
purchasers who trade based on inside information.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Greed is the fundamental driver of a market economy, but greed
comes in two forms. Greed can be helpful when it spurs innovation
and renewal, but greed is harmful when it seeks gain solely at the cost
of others. The job of market regulators is to separate beneficial greed
from harmful greed. The problem with regulating claims trading is
that it can be difficult to determine whether a purchaser is motivated
by a helpful or harmful form of greed. For example, Japonica's greed
was beneficial in that the firm relentlessly sought to acquire a com-
pany, oust an ineffective management team, and rebuild a struggling
manufacturer. But Japonica's greed was also harmful, because it uti-
lized inside information to acquire claims from creditors to whom it
owed a fiduciary duty. The transaction on the whole was beneficial,
but the means may have harmed some creditors. Any effective regu-
latory regime should separate the two forms of greed by allowing
claims trading transfers that benefit all of the parties involved and pe-
nalizing transfers that have harmful effects.
The most important purpose of this article is to renew the discus-
sion of the regulatory problems of claims trading at a time when our
nation's creditors are facing a tremendous increase in the number of
bankruptcy filings. The proposed regulatory regime recognizes that
purchasing claims and converting them into equity in a reorganized
entity is clearly an investment to which federal securities laws ought to
apply. Applying securities laws provides creditors with additional
remedies, including rescission, to insure against abusive claims trading
practices.
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